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Abstract: 
Theorists argue that exit rights can mitigate hold-up problems in venture capital. Using a 
hand-collected data-set of venture capital contracts from Germany we show that exit rights are 
included more frequently in venture capital contracts when a hold-up problem associated with 
the venture capitalist's exit decision is likely. Examples include drag-along and tag-along 
rights. Additionally, we find that almost all exit rights are allocated to the venture capitalist 
rather than to the entrepreneur. In addition, we show that besides the basic hold-up 
mechanism there are other mechanisms such as ex-ante bargaining power and the degree of 
pledgeable income that drive the allocation of exit rights. 
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The question how hold-up can be overcome is central to much of the literature on incomplete
contracts.1 The problem permeates all types of incomplete contracts, including ¯nancial and
venture capital contracts (Kaplan and StrÄ omberg (2003)). More speci¯cally, Chemla, Habib,
and Ljungqvist (2007), extending the model of NÄ oldeke and Schmidt (1995), propose exit rights
as a means to overcome hold-up in the relationship between the venture capitalist (VC) and the
entrepreneur with respect to the VC's exit decision. In this paper we empirically analyze why
and when exit rights are being used and to which party these rights are allocated. Our results
con¯rm the above view: exit rights are more frequently held by the VC when he is more likely
to be held-up by the entrepreneur.2
Given the VC's limited investment horizon, his exit decision is of vital importance (see Sahlmann
(1990) and Gompers and Lerner (1999)). The VC is, however, not the sole owner of the portfolio
¯rm. The ¯rm's founders normally hold substantial equity stakes, too. This may cause problems
as the VC's and the entrepreneur's preferences are often not aligned when it comes to the exit
decision. First, the entrepreneur derives private bene¯ts from being an owner-manager (Hellmann
(1998)). This may lead him to oppose certain exit choices, such as a trade sale in which he
typically experiences signi¯cant losses of control bene¯ts.3 Second, both the VC's organizational
structure (Sahlmann (1990)) and the temporary nature of his competitive advantage make the
VC more impatient than the entrepreneur and thus create room for hold-up by the entrepreneur.
Both reasons may result in ex-post renegotiation. Ex-post renegotiation and the possible losses
incurred by the VC in turn may lead to ex-ante under-investment. Therefore, it is not surprising
to see that the contracts between the VC and the founders often include provisions that govern
this crucial exit decision. Exit rights comprise clauses related to the two most important exit
channels, initial public o®erings (including demand rights and piggy back rights) and trade sales
(including drag-along rights, tag-along rights, and preemption rights).
In this paper we analyze the allocation of exit rights in general but stress two of the most
important clauses, drag-along rights and tag-along rights. A drag-along right gives its holder the
right to force all other shareholders in the ¯rm to sell their shares to an (outside) buyer at the
same price at which the right holder sells his shares. The tag-along right allows the holder to
include his shares in a sale for the same price as all other shareholders. Thus these rights possess
option-type characteristics.
In order to do so, we introduce a new hand-collected sample of 464 contracts between VCs and
entrepreneurs from Germany. Our sample ranges from 1990 to 2004 and is randomly drawn
from a large proportion of the German VC market. Our data set not only provides us with the
1See, e.g. Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1988), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart (1995), and
NÄ oldeke and Schmidt (1995).
2Note that in contrast to much on the literature on large shareholders, in the case of venture capital, both the
investors and the managers are in danger of being held up. See also Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997).
3In 2005, IPOs constituted only 10% of all exits in the US VC industry, while 90% of all ¯rms were sold via a
trade-sale (Kyriakos and Ueda (2007)).
1contracts between the VC and the entrepreneur but also allows us to observe characteristics of
the ¯rm, the VC, and the entrepreneur.
We use three di®erent proxies for the presence of a hold-up problem: the ¯rm's current investment
round, the presence of exit-expectations and the use of a closed-end fund by the VC. The intuition
behind the round variable is simple: on average the higher the round, the closer the exit and
thus the more likely the fact that the VC wants to pursue an exit that the entrepreneur uses
to enter into renegotiations in the absence of exit rights. Also, the higher the round, the more
of the VC's money and expertise has been sunk in the ¯rm. This increases the VC's lock-in
and ceteribus paribus should increase his desire to gain protection in form of exit rights. The
same is true for exit-expectations: if the VC has speci¯c exit expectations, he is more aware of
a potential hold-up problem and is more eager to include such rights in the contract. Finally, if
the VC has a closed-end fund, the VC's exit problem is more pressing as opposed to an open-end
fund as he has a shorter time horizon, that is he is less patient. This is both due to the limited
life span of his fund and due to the fact that he may need a timely exit to prove his ability to
the market.4
We show that the use of these exit rights is linked to our proxy variables for the presence of a
hold-up problem: higher round contracts, contracts of VCs with speci¯c exit expectations, and
contracts of VCs that are organized in the form of closed-end funds all entail more exit rights.
We also observe an almost exclusive allocation of exit rights towards the VC, but not towards
the entrepreneur.
Our results are robust across the di®erent exit rights as they act as complements rather than
substitutes. Also, our analysis shows that besides the hold-up explanation there are other mech-
anisms and factors driving the allocation of exit rights. In particular, ex-ante bargaining power,
as proposed by Inderst and MÄ uller (2004), seems to a®ect the usage of exit rights too, as well
as the amount of pledgeable income. We thereby also provide support for the idea put forward
in Aghion and Bolton (1992) that control rights can partially replace pledgeable income. Ad-
ditionally, we ¯nd support for the Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004) hypothesis that the VC's
liquidity needs may drive the inclusion of exit rights. Exit rights may allow the VC to realize the
investment. If the return on this investment is high enough the VC may be able to raise a new
fund.5 Also the fact that we can link the closed-end variable to the hold-up problem allows us
to show that the VC's organizational structure may a®ect contracts. Controlling for these addi-
tional mechanisms in our empirical analysis leaves the basic hold-up mechanism intact. Finally
we rule out institutional explanations as the driving force behind the use of exit rights.
We extend the literature in several aspects. First, we contribute to the growing literature that
studies contractual incompleteness empirically.6 First, we show that more option-like contract
4Kandel, Leshchinskii, and Yuklea (2006) show that the closed-end fund structure employed by many VCs
forces VCs to exit some of their investments earlier than under an open-end structure.
5Note that VCs are normally not allowed to reinvest funds from realized investments. Rather these funds have
to be paid out to the limited partners.
6See Chiappori and Salanie (2003) for a survey on the growing literature on empirical contract theory. Whinton
(2001) surveys empirical studies on incomplete contracts.
2clauses are used when hold-up is more likely, as proposed by Chemla, Habib, and Ljungqvist
(2007) and NÄ oldeke and Schmidt (1995). Our results are supported by two other papers that
show the same mechanisms being employed in other settings. Lerner and Malmendier (2007)
look at research agreements between bio-tech ¯rms. They show that option-style contracts are
more frequent when research is not directly contractible. Hotchkiss, Qian, and Song (2005) look
at merger termination clauses. These clauses allow the target to walk away from the deal, but
specify penalties in order to do so. As e®ort by the buyer is a deal speci¯c investment, this
protects his ex-ante investment.
Also, we contribute to the literature on venture capital exit rights by extending the analysis to
drag-along and tag-along rights. Smith (2005) discusses and describes exit rights empirically.
He focuses, however, mainly on put options and demand rights by using a sample of venture-
backed IPOs, i.e. of ¯rms which actually were divested via an IPO. Kaplan and StrÄ omberg (2003)
take a very broad look at contractual clauses between initial owners and active investors using
a sample of venture capital contracts.7 This allows the authors to relate real world contracts
to the ¯nancial contracting literature. Among other rights, they consider the use of put-options
(redemption rights). We also extend other empirical studies on contract design, such as Cumming
(2006), Lerner and Schoar (2005), as well as Kaplan, Martel, and StrÄ omberg (2007) who do not
consider exit rights in particular either.
We also contribute to the literature on the e±cient dissolution of partnerships (see Camton,
Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) for example), by showing the absence of one of the key clauses
found in partnerships, so called "shoot-out clauses". In a shoot-out clause, one partner in the
partnership names a price for the ¯rm. Then the other partners can decide whether they want
to buy or sell the partnership at that particular price. The usage of these clauses seems to be
widespread (see for example Brooks and Spier (2004)), even though their e±ciency is disputed
(see McAfee (1992)).
Finally, we are able to extend some earlier studies on hold-up that focused on relationships
between ¯rms. These include Joskow (1987) and Joskow (1988) who looks at whether coal
power stations located at the mouth of a coal mine are more likely to be vertically integrated
or not and Hubbard (2001) who analyzes the choice of long term versus short term contracts.
Instead, we focus on parties' abilities to act opportunistically within ¯rms.
There are two papers in the VC literature which are closely related to our analysis. Cumming
(2006) is to somehow the mirror-image of our analysis. While he looks into the e®ect of control
and exit rights on the choice of exit channels we focus on determinants of the allocation of exit
rights thereby also including exit channel expectation. F
The paper proceeds in the following way. In the next section we describe our data set. In the
third section we describe the most important rights used in Germany and discuss their economic
implications. In the fourth section we present univariate statistics that look at the link between
7Also, they show that both non-compete clauses and vesting provisions are frequently used in venture capital
contracts. They interpret the usage of these rights as evidence for the existence of a hold-up problem.
3exit rights and possible proxies for the hold-up problem. The ¯fth section presents multivariate
statistics that allow us to consider possible alternative explanations. Finally we discuss how the
institutional and legal settings might a®ect our results. The last section concludes.
2 The Data Set
Our analysis uses a proprietary, hand-collected data set which was compiled on the basis of
comprehensive and detailed documents made available to us by KfW (Kreditanstalt fÄ ur Wieder-
aufbau) in Frankfurt, Germany. KfW has a unique position in Germany's venture capital market.
Being Germany's largest promotional bank, it is in charge of large support programs that chan-
nel state funds to the private sector. However, during the time period covered in our sample (the
time period between 1990 and 2004) KfW never invested directly in any of the portfolio ¯rms
but supported the ¯rms by promoting the investment of the VC. In this position, it became
indirectly involved in a signi¯cant part of all venture capital deals in Germany during the last
decade. Since these programs allowed VCs to partially re¯nance their ¯nancial engagement in
the portfolio ¯rms via KfW, VCs had to apply for these re¯nancing schemes by submitting all
details of the relationship between the VC and the portfolio ¯rm to KfW, most notably, the
term sheets, the business plans and the shareholder's agreement. By giving us access to these
documents (to which we got access under strict con¯dentiality), KfW gave us the unique chance
to collect detailed information on the relationship between the VC and its portfolio ¯rm. Also,
as KfW's policy mandate was to promote the German venture capital market, they supported
a large proportion of the population of all investments realized by the German venture capital
industry in the time period under consideration.8
In order to reduce the very time-intensive task of collecting detailed information from the share-
holders agreements and the other documents to a manageable size, we selected a random sample.
We categorized each portfolio company into one of three classes with respect to their investment
date (before 1997, between 1998 and 2000, and 2001-2004) and eight classes with respect to
the programme or programme combination through which their VC investor was supported by
the KfW. This categorization was undertaken with the objective of achieving a balanced rep-
resentation of the population. We then drew a proportional random sample of 300 portfolio
companies.
For each investment round we evaluated the company's balance sheet data and its business plan
in order to get information with respect to the market position of the company and details
about the project ¯nanced. Moreover, we gathered detailed information about the timing and
conditions of the investment, and exit covenants from the term sheet and the shareholder's
agreement. We translated this information into quanti¯able variables. We complemented this
data set with information about the venture capitalist, that is his type (as indicated by the
8According to the German Venture Capital Association (see BVK (2003b) and BVK (2003a)), there were 11854
seed, start-up and expansion deals by its members in the relevant time period; KfW supported almost 7100 deals
of potential members. This implies a market coverage of approximately 60%.
4German Venture Capital Association), origin, or industry focus, taken from the VC's websites
and Thomson VentureXpert.
As usual in this type of studies we were confronted with the problem that not all data were
always available. Thus observations may vary depending on the variable studied.
2.1 Sample and Sample Selection
Table 1 gives an overview of the characteristics of the VC in the sample that constitutes the
basis for our analysis. Unfortunately, the data for 10 portfolio companies could not be evaluated,
therefore our random sample ¯nally consists of 290 portfolio companies which were ¯nanced in
464 investment rounds from 1990 until 2004.
As already indicated, this sample draws from a large proportion of all investments in the German
venture capital industry in the time period under consideration. As KfW's objective was to
support as many applicants as possible (and given the attractiveness of the programs) there also
seems to be no selection e®ect with respect to the entire KfW sample relative to the German
market itself. Therefore, we are con¯dent that we do not have any major selection bias in our
sample in this direction. Even if there were a selection bias in the overall KfW contract sample
(which we do not think to exist given the wide spectrum of VC ¯rms involved)9 our analysis still
depicts contract design patterns for a very large proportion (60%) of the German VC market
and should therefore be valuable in itself.
In addition, since we have been responsible for the sample selection process ourselves, we have
been able to make sure that no selection bias occurred via the provider of all of our documents
(the KfW). One obvious selection bias which we were not able to circumvent is the fact that
we are concentrating on one particular geographic region (Germany) and the associated venture
capital market.10 To a lesser degree this is true for the time period. We take all this into
consideration by interpreting our data sample as the description of a young and evolving venture
capital market.
Table 2 provides an overview of the main characteristics of the portfolio ¯rms as well as the
¯nancing rounds in our sample. The average amount invested per ¯nancing round is about
5.4 million euros and the portfolio companies are on average 4.77 years old when they receive
VC ¯nancing for the ¯rst time. The medians are considerably smaller (1.3 million euros and
3 years) which indicates that some outliers exist. At this point, one can already infer that the
percentage of start-up ¯nancing in our sample is quite high. Indeed, 66.5% of the ¯nancing
rounds correspond to early stage ¯rms.
Most of the portfolio companies of our sample (70%) are GmbHs (Limited Companies) and
only 28% are AGs (Public Limited Companies). Almost all portfolio companies have their head
9Table 1 shows this variation clearly: we have all major types of VCs that were active in Germany included in
the sample (Independent, public, and captive) and we have a substantial amount of Anglo-Saxon VCs (6.5%).
10Please see the seventh section for a discussion of how the legal and institutional background might a®ect our
¯ndings.
5o±ce in Germany (92%) but they are active in a broad range of industries: 5% in the ¯eld of
biology or biotechnology, 12% in the medical area, 27% in the IT and software branch, 6% in
the telecommunications and 10% in the internet sector, 15% in automobiles and engineering and
¯nally 4% in chemistry. 14% of all portfolio companies could not be classi¯ed in any of these
industries. Finally, 39% of all ¯nancing rounds were syndicated whereby the syndicate consists
on average of 3.69 partners and staging was used in 53% of all ¯rms. We include data from 91
VCs, an average VC ¯nancing 5 ¯rms, while the median VC ¯nances 2 ¯rms in our sample.
2.2 Variable Descriptions
Table 3 describes the variables of our data set. Additionally some variables describing control
rights are discussed in detail later on.
3 Functioning, legal framework and role of exit rights
3.1 Functioning of exit rights and legal framework
Often con°icts of interest regarding the exit decision can arise. First and most importantly, the
entrepreneur derives private bene¯ts from being an owner-manager (Hellmann (1998)). This may
lead him to oppose certain exit choices, especially a trade sale in which he typically experiences
signi¯cant losses of control bene¯ts (?). With an IPO interests are signi¯cantly more aligned
between the VC and the entrepreneur. In the course of an IPO the entrepreneur keeps or even
may, due to the exit of the VC, increase her degree of control over the ¯rm. Since the control
bene¯ts of the entrepreneur are the main source of con°icts of interest, such con°icts of interest
are signi¯cantly less pronounced with an IPO compared to a trade sale where the entrepreneur is
facing a high risk of being replaced. Second, both the VC's organizational structure (Sahlmann
(1990)) and the temporary nature of his competitive advantage make the VC more impatient
than the entrepreneur and thus may lead to con°icts of interests at the stage of the potential
exit. Since VCs typically have to return the cash°ows resulting from disinvestments to their
investors ( Gompers, P.A., Lerner, J., 1998. Venture capital distributions: short-run and long-
run reactions. J. Finance 53, 2161-2183. Seite 2164 ® Oder im "The Venture Capital Cycle"
Seite 266 (Chapter 13)). there is no need to exit investments due to attractive new investment
possibilities. However, VCs might be forced to disinvest anyway since they are often organized
as limited partnership for a pre-de¯ned period of time (typically between 10 to 12 years). With
the end-time of the fund approaching they have to sell their stakes in the ¯rm. The alternative
approach, namely to distribute shares in non-listed ¯rms to their investors is either not very
attractive (since the control premium is foregone) or not feasible at all if ¯rms are organized as
private-limited companies (which is the case in 70% of all ¯rms in our sample).
There are three basic exit routes through which the VC can sell his shares in a well-performing
venture.
6First, the VC might include his shares in the sales of shares in the course of an IPO. Given
that the entrepreneur does typically gain (through the exit of the VC) rather than loose control
in the ¯rm in the course of an IPO, a con°ict of interest is less likely to arise in this case.
Furthermore,in Germany, generally a simple majority is su±cient to opt for an IPO. In this case
the ¯rm's board is bound by this decision and has a legal obligation to register the ¯rm with a
stock exchange.11 Hence, even if the entrepreneur would oppose an IPO the VC may overcome
this opposition if he has the majority of voting rights.
The second exit channel for the VC is a partial sale (often to another ¯nancial investor, hence
called a secondary). In a partial sale only the VC sells his part of the ¯rm. Hence, the control
position of the entrepreneur is in general not altered leading to fewer con°icts of interest. The
disadvantage of this exit channel is that it is more di±cult to realize the extract extra value
created by a trade buyer. This extra value very often requires the complete take-over of the ¯rm
and its integration into the one of the trade buyer (cf .... ??).
This latter positive e®ect can be realized in the course of an exit of the VC via a complete sale.
A trade sale, however, brings about the danger for the entrepreneur to be replaced in the course
of the integration of the venture in the buyer's ¯rm implying the complete loss of all her control
bene¯ts. Hence, the trade sale exit channel leads to a con°ict of interest and potentially to strong
opposition of the entrepreneur. This takes place against some particularities of German corporate
law. Generally, in Germany no shareholder can force another shareholder to sell his shares. The
same is true for the ¯rm's board. So in particular, a simple majority in the shareholder's meeting
is not su±cient to enforce a trade-sale against the will of shareholders. Also, there are strict rules
about minority freeze-outs in Germany.12 Also, shareholders cannot be banned from selling their
shares to outsiders unless the ¯rm's charter is amended.
****Call OPtion Argument***
This leaves us with the conclusion that a complete (trade) sale is more prone to con°icts of in-
terests which can not be resolved via the ¯rm's baseline charta as provided by German corporate
law but rather require explicit exit rights. In contrast, con°icts of interest are much less impor-
tant and can be addressed to a large extent by the governance provided by German corporate
law.
Against this background we discuss now the functioning of di®erent exit rights. Exit rights grant
the holder the right to decide about the disposal (or acquisition) of one's own or other's shares
of the ¯rm. Thus, they can be considered as options that grant various rights in case an exit is
considered (Chemla, Habib, and Ljungqvist (2007)). We can distinguish between ¯ve main exit
rights that can be di®erentiated according to the di®erent types of options they grant to their
holder (see the left-hand part of table 4).
These ¯rst three rights are directed towards the possibility of a trade sale as an exit channel and
11For an excellent discussion see Baums and MÄ oller (2002).
12This applies to AGs where a shareholder needs more than 95% of all shares in order to be able to squeeze
out other shareholders (x327a AktG). As there is no such clause for GmbHs, there is no way to remove minority
shareholders unless there is a prior clause in the ¯rm's charter.
7are, given, our above arguments in the center of our interest. We refer to them as trade sales
rights.
First, we observe drag-along clauses. This clause gives its holder, if he has achieved a deal
with a buyer, the right to force all other shareholders to sell their shares for the same conditions
to the buyer. This avoids an exit being delayed or stopped entirely by one party that is unwilling
to sell. The drag-along right constitutes a call option on the shares of the other shareholders
where the price agreed upon with outside parties acts as an endogenous strike price. Giving a
party a drag-along right creates scope for moral hazard on the side of the owner of the right -
imagine a VC that negotiates a low price for the ¯rm but receives favors or kickbacks from the
buyer later on. In this case, a drag-along should be accompanied by a pre-emption right granted
to the entrepreneur.
A pre-emption right allows the holder of the right to force any selling shareholders to o®er
all the shares tendered to the owner of the pre-emption right at "fair value" rather than to
an outside buyer. Fair value is often interpreted as the price the outside investor is willing to
pay. Thus, the owner of the preemption right holds a call option with "fair value" denoting the
strike price of the option. The pre-emption right avoids that a shareholder sells his stake in the
company to an unwanted third party which may alter the balance of power in the company
leading to negative e®ects on the old owners. If the entrepreneur possesses the pre-emption right
she can prevent that the VC investor can sell his shares to an outside party. One restriction
to this is that the entrepreneur needs to overcome her potential wealth constraint in order to
make her pre-emption right e®ective. In contrast, the VC can use his pre-emption right in order
to avoid that the entrepreneur sells out leaving the VC with a new unwanted party which may
potentially engage in actions which reduce the value of the VC's shares (such as strategic buyers
which aim to sell crucial assets to other parts of the conglomerate at too low prices).
Third, tag-along clauses preclude that one of the parties sells its shares to an outside investor
without giving the holder of the right the chance to follow suit. It gives its holder the right to
include his shares in the sale at the same price as the one o®ered to the initial party13. Thus
the tag-along clause constitutes a put right with an endogenous strike price (the price o®ered by
the buyer) A tag-along clause may avoid that one party is excluded from a value-increasing sale
of the ¯rm to a buyer who only acquires part of the shares. Value increases may be caused, for
example, by synergies created or by a sale to a direct competitor and the associated increase in
market power. In addition, it denies the other party the ability to sell parts of the company to
an outsider which has the ability and incentive to undertake measures to reduce the value of the
¯rm, i.e. via asset-stripping or transfer-pricing, without compensating the other shareholders.
Finally, we observe two exit rights which are especially important in the course of an initial
public o®ering being used as the exit channel for the initial owners of the company. Given that
we have argued that there are fewer con°icts of interests in the case of an IPO and given that
13This implies that if the buyer is only willing to buy some fraction of the ¯rm, the shares of the holder of the
tag-along right are included instead of the shares of the selling shareholder.
8we observe them in fewer case, we discuss them only quite brie°y.
Piggy-back rights allow each party to include their shares in an initial public o®ering in
proportion to their stakes in the ¯rm. Thereby, the exclusion from an IPO can be avoided. This
right avoids that some shareholders can threaten to exclude other shareholders from the IPO.
The holder of the right can sell his shares at the same price as all other parties whose shares are
sold via the IPO. It is in this sense that piggy-back rights constitute a put option (and therefore
are closely related to tag-along rights in the case of a trade sale) with the IPO price being the
endogenous strike price.
Finally, demand rights allow the holder to force the other shareholders to agree to take the
company public. Thereby, they deny other shareholders the chance to prevent or threaten to
prevent a value-increasing IPO. Preventing shareholders to threaten to block a value-increasing
IPO reduces their ex-post bargaining power and therefore the ability to capture a larger share
of the entire payo®. Demand rights are (similar to drag-along rights for the trade sale case) call
options with endogenous strike prices.
3.2 Theoretical arguments for the allocation of exit rights
In this subsection we will discuss two main theoretical approaches which address exit clauses
and aim to explain their usage in VC contracts. In both approaches exit rights shift decision
power towards the owner of the right at the time of the potential exit. If there are ex-post
renegotiations, the bargaining power of the owner of exit right increases.
The ¯rst type of explanation views exit rights as measures to provide incentives to undertake
an e±cient level of speci¯c investments in the project. The second type of explanation considers
exit rights as instruments to provide proper incentives for project choice and to ensure ¯nancing
of the project per se.
Chemla, Habib, and Ljungqvist (2007) belonging to the ¯rst type of explanations show that exit
clauses can ensure that the contracting parties make e±cient ex-ante speci¯c investments in the
¯rm. They build on the theory-of-the-¯rm literature (see e.g. Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart
and Moore (1990), Hart (1995) and in particular NÄ oldeke and Schmidt (1995)) and apply this
framework to shareholder agreements.14 They argue that exit clauses prevent the distortion of
ex-ante investments by precluding hold-up of value-increasing sales of the company as well as
of avoiding value-destroying ex-post transfers. The usage of these rights especially matters if,
in the absence of these rights, the bargaining power of the party which contributes most to the
relationship would be quite weak. The overall notion is that these exit rights are more prevalent
the more pronounced the distortions of ex-ante investments are. Against the background of our
above discussion we would expect that it is typically the venture capitalists who is most prone
to facing a weak ex-post bargaining power with respect to the exit decision (due to the limited
life-time of the VC's investment vehicle as well as due to the VC's decreasing specialization
14In particular, they extend NÄ oldeke and Schmidt (1995) by allowing for endogenous strike prices associated
with the options.
9advantage over time ; Anm. macht dies Sinn?). Therefore, we would expect that proxies for the
severity of the exit problem and the relative value importance of the VC's investment possible
faces (these can be ¯rm characteristics or the VC's characteristics and the VC's investment
condition) are most important with respect to the usage and allocation of exit rights. Rights
allocated towards E??...........
Rather than focusing on hindering negative or fostering positive transfers in the course of the
exit, Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004)) focuses on the VC's potential need for liquidity. They,
too, view exit rights as measures to provide proper incentives for the VC to undertake speci¯c
investments (i.e. monitoring activities of the VC)15 They analyze the choice of exit rights based
on the trade o® between the need for monitoring and the demand for liquidity in a mechanism
design framework rather than in a model of incomplete contracting. More illiquidity increases
the incentive of the active monitor (the VC) to pursue his task. This, however, comes at a cost
since it imposes an illiquidity premium on the VC. Exit rights allow the VC to unwind his
investment, thereby making the contract more liquid. Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004) show
that it is optimal to choose a more liquid contract (i.e. employ more exit rights) if the VC has
a more pronounced potential demand for liquidity and if outside investors (investors in public
markets or a trade buyer) receive signals of better quality at lower costs. They argue that the
determinants of the intensity of liquidity demand are the VC's reputation (requiring exits less
strongly) as well as hot-issue markets (??? nochmals saber checken).
The second approach views exit rights as measures to ensure ¯nancing per se and models them
as substitutes for pledgable income.16 Viewing control rights as substitutes for limited pledgable
cash °ows focuses on the role of control rights in the interaction between cash-°ow rights and
private bene¯ts (see most notably Aghion and Bolton (1992), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990),
Hart and Moore (1994), and Hart and Moore (1998)).17 Control rights may resolve the potential
con°icts between monetary and non-monetary bene¯ts and interests arising from the involvement
with the ¯rm (in our particular context this involves the choice of exit timing and exit channel,
i.e. di®erent strategies which may come with the trade-o® between non-monetary and monetary
payo®s). The basic idea is to replenish the participation constraint of the investor in the case of
lacking or unveri¯able monetary returns with decision and control rights allocated to the investor.
In contrast to the speci¯c investment approach, this approach implies that the characteristics of
the ¯rm, namely the lack or presence of pledgable income, rather then the VC's characteristics
matter most for the allocation of exit rights.
In our empirical analysis we aim to analyze which is of the two approaches is supported to which
extent by our data.
15Bascha and Walz (2001) and Hellmann (2006) address potential con°icts of interest regarding exit choices as
well. But they provide these con°icts of interests as a rationale for convertible securities rather than for the kind
of exit rights discussed in our paper.
16There is an additional view on control rights in which control rights act as a signalling device (see Dessein
(2005)). Due to the fact that exit issues are less of importance at the beginning of the relationship between the
VC and the entrepreneur and are therefore of little relative value relevance we neglect this view in the following.
17For an early contribution on the joint allocation of control and ownership see Chan, Siegel, and Thakor (1990).
104 Descriptive Results
In this section we present our descriptive ¯ndings for the di®erent exit clauses considered in this
paper.
Allocation: A ¯rst look on the left-hand part of table 4 reveals the main elements of the exit rights
prevailing in our data set. First, we should note that sale rights, in contrast to IPO rights, can
be observed in a range of one to two thirds of all cases. We do not observe signi¯cant di®erences
in the usage of drag-along, tag-along and preemption rights. The use of IPO rights seems to be,
however, quite limited (below three percent of all cases).18 This is true for both piggy-back as
well as demand rights.19 It is worth noting that in all cases, except with pre-emption rights, it
is always the VC who holds the exit right. With pre-emption rights it is the entrepreneur who
holds the right in one third of all cases.
The (almost) exclusive allocation of control rights to one party, the VC, is something that is
not unusual in incomplete contracts, as predicted by Chemla, Habib, and Ljungqvist (2007) and
Hart (1995). The fact that these control rights are allocated to the ¯nancier and not the en-
trepreneur/manager is di®erent from some predictions on managerial incentives and monitoring
(see for example Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) or ? for entrepreneurial (non-VC) ¯rms.).
One potential counterargument, especially with respect to ¯rm characteristics having an in°u-
ence on the allocation of exit rights is, that VCs might be using boilerplate contracts. Table 5
reveals that this is not the case. To show this, we compute how often VCs include trade-sale
clauses in their contracts and then consider the distribution function over their respective port-
folio ¯rms. VC's that never or always use these clauses exist, but we also a large number of VCs
including these clauses in some, but not all of their contracts. Indeed, the average VC includes
drag-along rights in 40% of his contracts and tag-along rights in about 50% of his contracts.
However, what seems to be clear is that the usage varies across VCs and while there may be
standard contracts that are proposed by VCs not all these covenants are automatically included
in the ¯nal contract.
Correlation: As a further step towards a closer examination of the di®erent exit rights, it is helpful
to take a look into the interrelationship between the di®erent exit rights. Table 4 describes the
correlations among the di®erent exit rights. The pairwise correlations between all exit rights are
positive and statistically di®erent from zero at least at a ten percent con¯dence interval.20 Hence,
we can interpret these exit rights as being complements rather than substitutes. If contracts
allocate one exit right to the VC it is likely that the VC also possesses other exit rights. This
implies for our future analysis that we can expect that the allocation of exit rights towards the
VC is by and large governed by the same factors.
18Note that Smith (2005) reports demand registration rights to be included in more than 90% of all US VC
contracts.
19The fact that we observe more sale rights than IPO rights could be an indication that information acquisition
matters. However, we will also discuss a potential (legal) explanation for this interesting ¯nding in a later chapter.
20The single exception being the correlation between the piggy-back right and entrepreneur preemption, which
is marginally insigni¯cant (at the 13% con¯dence interval).
11Furthermore, this results also means a positive and statistically signi¯cant correlation between
the occurrence of a drag-along right and pre-emption rights allocated towards the entrepreneur.
It suggests that the potential hold-up induced by drag-along rights is tackled by incorporating
pre-emption rights for the entrepreneur in the contract in turn.
In a next step we will investigate some factors that may potentially a®ect the usage and allocation
of exit rights. We focus on four aspects which seem to play a major role for the allocation of
exit rights in our data set: ¯rst, the investment round to which the observed contract relates
to, second, the expectations of the VC regarding trade sales; third, the VC's organizational
structure of the VC fund (being a closed-end fund or not) and ¯nally time period in which the
respective contract has been signed.
The ¯rst three variables are related to the theories discussed above. The fourth variable (Periods)
depicts the evolution of exit rights along the time dimension of our sample. We interpret, the
round variable in a ¯rst step (later on we discuss alternative interpretations) as a proxy for rela-
tive weight of the VC's speci¯c investment in the ¯rm. This is done against the background that
investments increase from round to round. Furthermore, the human capital and technological
knowledge of the entrepreneur decrease over time making the entrepreneur's speci¯c investment
relatively less important. In turn, the more the ¯rm matures the more important advice of the
VC on management issue becomes thereby also increasing the relative value contribution of the
VC's speci¯c investment.
Expectations on a trade sale occurring can be regarded as a proxy for the likelihood of the
exit channel with the most pronounced con°icts of interest. Given that VCs indicate (in the
investment memorandum) that they expect a trade sale to occur they are foreseeing potential
con°icts of interest making the ex-post bargaining game more important.
The fact that VCs are organized as closed-end funds with a limited life time imposes the pressure
on the VC do disinvest before the fund life ends. This is especially true in cases in which the
investment round takes place in later periods of the fund's life. The more pressing a sale becomes
the weaker the ex-post bargaining position of the VC.
Hence, we interpret the round variable as a proxy for the relative importance of the VC's speci¯c
investment, while we consider the VC's expectation on the trade sale as being the most likely
exit channel as proxy for the likelihood of the ex-post bargaining game. The closed-end fund
variable is interpreted as a proxy for the VC's weakness in the ex-pots bargaining position.
4.1 Rounds
Given that we consider the ¯rm's investment round as a candidate for an indicator of the relative
importance of the VC's speci¯c investment we expect to see more exit rights the higher the ¯rm's
round.
Table 6 shows the allocation of exit rights across investment rounds. The ¯rst indication of
a positive relationship between the usage of exit rights and the respective round is given in
12panel A. 1 of table 6. In this panel we outline the relationship between exit rights and rounds
for all ¯rms. It is obvious that there is a statistically signi¯cant upward trend for all trade-sale
rights. The increase of exit rights used over rounds is also economically meaningful. For instance,
whereas drag-along rights are used in 31 % of all cases in the ¯rst round, we observe them in 69
% of all third investment rounds. The usage of take-along rights precisely double from 40% to
80% between the ¯rst and third round. This upward trend across rounds can not be observed
for the IPO rights.
We split the entire sample according to VC characteristics as we want to ¯nd out whether
VC selection could be driving the upward trend rather than pure round e®ects. As table 1
shows, the percentage of independent VCs increases steadily over time. Thus, our results might
be simply driven by the fact that public VCs are less professional and there is a mechanical
relationship between more exit rights and more independent VCs. Looking at the independent
VC subsample only reveals that the pure round e®ects are statistically somewhat less signi¯cant
but do not vanish. We still observe a statistically signi¯cant increase in the use of exit rights
in the third round relative to the ¯rst round for all trade sale rights allocated towards the VC.
The di®erences between the ¯rst and second as well as between the second and third round are
still present and point all in an upward direction, albeit there are fewer statistically signi¯cant
di®erences. However, this may be due to the largely reduced number of observations. All in all
this leads us to conclude that our results do not seem to be simply driven by the VC's type.
There is, however, a competing explanation for our observation that trade sale rights are more
often used in later rounds: this pattern could simply be due to boundedly-rational behavior of
the agents involved. Bolton/Faure-Grimaud (2008) take a closer look into this by investigating
the allocation of control rights in a framework in which agents face time-costs of deliberating
current and future transactions. They develop a theory of endogenously incomplete contracts
and show that agents leave some enforceable future transactions unspeci¯ed and instead specify
which agent has the right to decide these transactions. Thereby, control rights allow to defer
time-consuming negotiations and decisions on those transactions to a later date. Their theory
let's expect that control rights will be allocated to the more cautious party. Furthermore, their
approach indicates that when the contracting agents have more con°icting objectives, equilib-
rium con- tracts are more complete, i.e. in our context, trade sale rights should be included in
contracts early on. We aim to distinguish between our initial interpretation of the in°uence of
the round variable and this alternative hypothesis based on bounded-rationality later on in our
multi-variate analysis.
4.2 Exit Channel Expectations
In table ?? we consider to what degree speci¯c trade sale expectations (i.e expectations on the
precise exit channel) drive the allocation of exit rights. It turns out that despite the fact that the
VC's investment in the portfolio ¯rm is always of a temporary nature it is only in those cases
in which the VC has speci¯c expectations regarding the exit channel that the VC cares about
13exit rights in the contract. We interpret trade sale expectations as proxies for the likelihood of
the con°ict of interest arising with with the exit process. This should give them strong enough
incentives to include measures into the contract which allow to mitigate or even to eliminate
problems associated with the VC's low ex-post bargaining power.
The trade sale expectation variable stems from the investment memorandi in which VC indi-
cate whether they do have expectations with respect to the exit channel. This variable clearly
indicates expectations regarding the exit channel rather than the exit timing. This can be seen
most clearly by the fact that we observe a very low and even positive correlation between the
trade sale expectation variable and the time to exit indicated by the VC (in the investment
memorandum as well). The positive correlation coe±cient (of 0.05 which is, however, not signif-
icant) implies that VC do expect to settle with a trade sale in cases in which the time to exit is
expected to be longer.
The observed di®erences between cases in which VCs expect a trade sale and those in which
they do not is not only statistically but also economically signi¯cant for all trade sale rights.
In all ¯rms, drag-along (tag-along) rights are allocated towards the VC in 62% (73%) of all
investments if VCs expect a trade sale to occur while the respective numbers are 33% (44%) if
a trade sale is not explicitly expected. If we look only into ¯rst round investments, the numbers
are reduced but the di®erence between cases in which a trade sale is expected and cases in which
this is not the case even increase slightly. For drag-along rights the numbers are 58% if a trade
sale is expected and 24% if this is not the case. The respective numbers for the tag-along right
are 71% and 35%.
4.3 Closed-End Fund
We consider the choice of organizational form for the VC as a one further proxy for the presence
of a hold-up problem. Closed-end funds force the VC to return its capital to its limited partner
after a given period of time. Therefore, VCs being organized as closed-end funds are more prone
to be held up the entrepreneur, as they will be less patient than VCs with open-end funds. Table
7 presents evidence that there exists a di®erence in the use of exit rights between VCs that do
not use this organizational form and VCs that use it.
The ¯rst panel compares the usage across all those contracts for which we have information
about the organizational form. We ¯nd that the di®erence in the usage for drag-along rights is
statistically signi¯cant at the one percent level. Indeed the sheer magnitude of the di®erence
(56% vs. 12%) shows the importance of this variable. The same result holds for tag-along rights,
and VC preemption rights.
When we start to consider ¯rst round investments only, pretty much the same picture starts
to emerge. As, given our discussion of an increased usage of trade sale rights in higher rounds
suggests, the numbers are reduced, but the underlying pattern remains. The di®erences are,
with the exception of the pre-emption right allocated towards the entrepreneur always highly
statistically signi¯cant
14Thus we ¯nd strong evidence that all three factors we have considered so far are relevant for the
allocation of exit rights. This clearly gives some ¯rst indication that trade sale rights indeed are
used to provide proper incentives for speci¯c investments (of the VC.
Before we turn to a more detailed multivariate analysis, we take a quick into the the evolution
of exit rights over calendar time.
4.4 Periods
Finally, in table 6, Panel B we look at possible changes in the use of exit rights over time.
While this is not directly connected to our hypothesis, the fact that the German VC market
developed rapidly in the years considered makes it necessary to discern potential learning e®ects
from hold-up. We ¯nd that the usage of exit rights increases over (calendar) time.
We interpret this increase of the usage of exit rights over time as learning process. There are
several reasons for this. First, there is a continuous increase in the use of these rights, very
much in contrast to a change in bargaining power, where one would expect a drop in the second
period. Second, as we will show in chapter six, there were no major changes to the relevant laws
in Germany.
We should note that the usage of exit rights was legally feasible right from the beginning of our
observation period. Baums and MÄ oller (2002) who discuss exit rights from a legal point of view
stress that at the time of the initial draft of their article (1999), all types of exit rights discussed
were possible in Germany. Additionally, in table 4 we document the year in which we observe
each right for the ¯rst time in our sample. The ¯rst occurrence is for preemption rights as early
as 1991. Drag-along and tag-along rights occur as early as 1995 and 1994 respectively. As the
majority of our observations stem from the periods after 1998 (400 out of 464) it is clear that
there seemed to be no legal obstacles to implement exit rights in German VC contracts right
from the beginning.
In the course of this process VCs in the German market seemed to have learned how to address
potential problems associated with the exit process and have employed exit rights in more and
more contracts. The di®erences across the three time periods are not only statistically signi¯cant
but also of pronounced magnitude. Whereas e.g. drag-along rights in the ¯rst period (until 1998)
are used in only 8 percent of all contracts, this number increases steadily to 33 percent in period
2 (1998 until 2000) and 63 percent in the third period (2001-2004). Pretty much the same
pattern can be observed with all other exit rights. ******************* This pattern remains
intact if we consider only ¯rst rounds (see Table table 6, Panel B.2). This controls for the
round e®ect interfering with the time period e®ect. Indeed, there is a statistically signi¯cant
di®erence between the ¯rst and third period, although the di®erences are often not statistically
signi¯cant between the ¯rst and second as well as between the second and third period. As in
our previous analysis of round e®ects the statistical signi¯cance disappears for the IPO rights
and the preemption right allocated towards the entrepreneur. Once again this has to be seen
15against the background of the decrease in sample size in case of our consideration of subsamples.
************************************
To sum up, we have shown that VCs use more exit rights for ¯rms that are in higher rounds, for
¯rms for which they have speci¯c exit expectations and for ¯rms that use closed-end funds. We
interpret rounds, exit expectations, and the closed-end fund dummy as indicators for the speci¯c
investment explanation . Additionally, we show that there are changes in the overall levels of
clauses used. We interpret them as evidence for learning, but we also show that learning is not
the sole driving force behind the increase in exit rights.
5 Multivariate Analysis
In this section we extend our results from the last section. We now relate the choice of exit rights
to ¯rm and VC characteristics. We thereby have two main objectives. First, we want to check
whether the hold-up hypothesis is con¯rmed in the multivariate analysis. Second, we want to
analyze whether there are any additional or alternative mechanisms and determinants driving
the allocation of control rights.
We focus now on three clauses. We saw in the last section that drag-along and tag-along rights are
the most frequently encountered rights in our sample. Additionally, we will consider preemption
rights as the ¯nal trade-sale right. We proceed in the following way: First, we analyze the
determinants of drag-along clauses and tag-along clauses. We employ probit regressions in order
to analyze the importance of the hold-up problem. Then we repeat this for all trade sale rights
allocated to the VC in our data set: the sum of the VC's preemption right dummy, the drag and
tag-along dummies.21 For this last part we use an ordered probit regression.
5.1 Main Findings on the Hold-up Hypothesis
We start our analysis with the three main variables from the previous section which we use as
proxies for the severity of the hold-up problem: the round variable, the exit expectations and the
closed-end funds variable. Models (1), (2) and (3) in table 8 reveal that the e®ect of these three
variables on the probability of using a drag-along right is positive, highly statistically signi¯cant
and economically pronounced. This remains basically unchanged if we employ three types of
control variables: ¯rm characteristics, industry dummies and time period dummies (see Model
(4) in table 8).
With respect to industry dummies we employ a dummy for high-tech industries in our sample
(summarizing biotechnology, IT and telecommunications as well as other high-tech industries).
This approach has proven superior to using pure industry dummies since the latter turned out
to show too little in-group variation due to our narrow de¯nition of industries. We measure
period e®ects relative to period 2. As we saw in chapter 5 this is an important control variable
21Including the IPO rights would change little but leads to signi¯cant losses of observations due to missing data
points.
16that allows us to ¯lter out potential learning e®ects. We use the ¯nished-product variable which
indicates whether the ¯rm already has a ¯nished product or not at the time the contract is signed
as a proxy for ¯rm quality in order to avoid using potentially uninformative balance sheet data.
The marginal e®ects drop in size, but are still signi¯cant at he 1 percent level. VCs which do
have expectations about the exit mode are 32 percent more likely to include a drag-along clause
in their contracts. The di®erence between the likelihood of including a drag-along clause in the
contract increases by 17 percent between the ¯rst and the third round (see Model (4) in table
8). Furthermore, investments which are undertaken by VCs organized as closed-end funds are
32 percent more likely to have drag-along rights in the contract compared to investments which
are undertaken by VCs being organized as open-end funds.
We interpret this as strong support for the hold-up hypothesis. As discussed before, all three
variables can be viewed as indicators for a potential hold-up problem.22 However, this does not
allow us to say the same about the validity of the Aghion and Tirole (1997) hypothesis.23 We
should also note, however, that the closed-end fund variable could to some extent also stand for
the liquidity needs of the VCs (consistent with Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004)).
Taking a closer look at tables 10 and 12 reveals that the picture is quite the same when we
analyze the other two dependent variables, the tag-along right and all sale-rights. With regard to
statistical signi¯cance, the e®ects are roughly the same. The economic size of the e®ects is slightly
higher with tag-along clauses for the round variable and marginally lower for exit expectations
and the closed-end funds variable compared to drag-along clauses. Exit expectations increase the
likelihood of employing tag-along rights by 31 percent while closed-end funds increase it by the
same number. The likelihood of using tag-along rights increases from ¯rst-round to third-round
contracts by 20 percent.24
The control variables in Models (4) of tables 8, 10 and 12 reveal that signi¯cantly more exit
rights are employed in period 3, thereby supporting our ¯ndings from the univariate statistics.
The e®ect of period 1 is always negative, but only statistically signi¯cant in some regression in
the case of drag-along clauses and in one regression of the all sale-rights variable (see Model
(5) in table 13). All this indicates a time trend in the German VC industry with respect to the
usage of the exit rights. As discussed in the previous section, one possible interpretation of this
e®ect is learning. This ¯nding also indicates that while there certainly are changes in the usage
22Since the number of rounds is determined by staged ¯nancing choices, the round variable could be considered
to be an endogenous variable. Since, however, there is no obvious relationship between staged ¯nancing choices
and exit rights, we think that higher number of rounds are nevertheless a good proxy for the closeness of the exit
decision and hence, for the importance of the hold-up problem.
23We face the following problem: Exit expectations can be interpreted as a proxy for both the hold-up approach
and the information acquisition approach, while the interpretation of rounds and the closed-end fund dummy is
unambiguous in the sense that they both proxy for hold-up only. Therefore, as all three variables are signi¯cant and
go in the same direction, we can be certain that hold-up matters, but we cannot say the same about information
acquisition. Furthermore, the information acquisition mechanism would predict a signi¯cant di®erence in the
impact of the exit expectations variable on the usage of drag-along and tag-along rights. However, we do not
observe such a di®erence.
24In our ordered probit regression on the determinants of all exit clauses (i.e. in tables 12 and 13) we report
coe±cients rather than marginal e®ects. Thereby, we avoid reporting the vast number of marginal e®ects for all
the three realizations of our endogenous variable.
17of exit rights over time, hold-up matters nonetheless.
The one control variable that we omit from Model (4) is the independent VC dummy. The
reason for that is that the independent VC dummy is highly correlated with the closed-end fund
variable. This in turn makes it impossible to include both variables in the same regression. In
the next section, however, we will approach the in°uence of VC characteristics, among other
factors, in a lot more detail.
5.2 Alternative explanations
Starting from these ¯ndings, we want to investigate whether alternative hypothesis other than
hold-up are driving our results. We start by looking into whether VC characteristics can explain
the allocation of exit rights. In a second step we investigate the impact of ex-ante bargaining
power before we ¯nally turn to entrepreneur characteristics.
5.2.1 VC Sophistication & Reputation:
A ¯rst alternative hypothesis is that VC experience or sophistication explain the allocation of exit
rights. In particular one might expect that only sophisticated VCs understand the importance
exit rights properly and include them in their contracts early on. This seems to be a quite natural
concern, given that the German VC market is rather young and developing fast. The answer to
this alternative explanation is only partially in the a±rmative. We look into three proxies for
VC sophistication. First, we use a US-VC dummy. Second, we employ VC age as a proxy for VC
sophistication, claiming that more experienced VCs are more sophisticated as well. It turns out
that the US-VC variable does not have any statistically signi¯cant e®ect for any of our three cases
(see Model (5) in tables 8, 10, and 12). The VC age variable in the respective Models (6) in each
of the three tables is always negative and statistically signi¯cant, showing that more experienced
VCs employ more drag-along, tag-along, and exit rights in general (note that VC age is de¯ned as
the VC's founding year, meaning that lower levels re°ect more experienced VCs). However, the
inclusion of the VC's age leaves our main ¯ndings qualitatively unchanged. Given that the VC
age variable's signi¯cance is very robust across di®erent speci¯cations we include this variable
in the following regression and interpret it as a control variable for VC sophistication. Finally,
we allow for a proxy of VC reputation: our information variable measures the amount of public
information available about the VC. This variable, however, does not reveal any positive impact
on our dependent variables (see Models (7) in all three type of regressions).
Finally, one could argue that closed-end funds and exit expectations stand for VC sophistication
rather than for a hold-up problem. In order to test this issue, we pursue the following strategy.
First, we replace the closed-end fund variable with our fund age variable. Second, since we can
not easily replace the exit expectations variable we also employ as many additional proxies for VC
sophistication, such as VC age and the information variable, as possible.25 Fund age is a natural
25The usual way to deal with this unobserved heterogeneity would be to use VC ¯xed e®ects. The main problem
18extension of the closed-end fund dummy, as it looks at how long ago the last fund closing took
place.26 This should allow us to break the possible link between experience and organizational
form, as the latest fund closing should be less directly depend VC upon sophistication, while it
emphasizes the possible hold-up problem.27 What we ¯nd is quite reassuring (see Models (10)):
for both the drag-along and the tag-along right, fund age is highly signi¯cant and shows the
correct sign, while it has the right sign for our general exit rights variable but the signi¯cance
level is just below the 10 percent level. Also, we ¯nd that several other variables that control
for VC sophistication are signi¯cant, such as VC age: older VCs are more likely to include exit
rights. The same is true for all exit rights.
5.2.2 Syndication Structure:
Furthermore, we are interested to what extent the syndication structure a®ects the usage of exit
rights. The intuition behind this is that we may actually consider the wrong hold-up problem:
possibly it is not the entrepreneur but fellow VCs that will hold each up or both problems could
persist at the same time. Therefore, a larger syndicate may indicate a more pronounced hold-up
problem. Model (9) in table 8 displays the positive but insigni¯cant e®ect of the syndication
variable while leaving all the previous estimates in place. This can be interpreted as support
for the fact that the hold-up problem exists between the VC and the entrepreneur rather than
among the VCs. This picture is replicated with the tag-along clause and the all exits rights
variable (see Model (9) in tables 10 and 12). Our previous ¯ndings, especially those re°ecting
the hold-up problem between the VC and the entrepreneur (round and planned exit variables)
are essentially una®ected.
5.2.3 Ex-ante Bargaining power:
A further important competing hypothesis is that usage of exit-right is simply driven by the
amount of ex-ante bargaining power that the VC holds. If he musters a lot, the VC might be
able to include more favorable terms in the contract. We take a closer look at this alternative
by investigating a number of proxies for the distribution of bargaining power between the en-
trepreneur and the VC. The ¯rst candidate is the period 2 dummy (1998-2000). It is a proxy for
the boom period in the global high-tech and VC markets. In this period many newly entered
VCs competed with established VCs in what became known as 'money chasing deals' (see Gom-
pers and Lerner (2000)). For all three types of regressions (see Models (8) in tables 8, 12 and
10) we ¯nd a negative and signi¯cant e®ect of the period 2 variable. This indicates that during
this time period VCs indeed were able to include { relative to the two other time periods { less
we have with this speci¯cation is that we do not observe most VCs often enough to run a Logit model with ¯xed
e®ects.
26For open-end funds, the natural coding in this case is zero.
27The reason we normally do not use fund age is that its results are somewhat less intuitive to interpret than
the closed-end fund dummy.
19drag-along and tag-along rights in general. This provides some initial evidence of the importance
of the bargaining hypothesis.
However, given our previous ¯ndings on learning, this may simply re°ect a learning process over
time. In order to provide more support for the bargaining hypothesis, we look into the e®ects
of fund in°ows into the German VC market. Against the background of the bargaining power
hypothesis we would expect that VCs will have low bargaining power when there are high fund
in°ows and hence will be able to include only comparatively few exit rights in the contract. This
view is only partially validated in our regressions which reveal a negative coe±cient (see Models
(11) in tables 9, 11, and 13). The coe±cient is, however, never signi¯cant.
One further proxy for ex-ante bargaining power is the VC majority variable: when the VC holds
a majority of the ¯rm's voting rights, this could indicate that the VC has more bargaining power
at the contracting stage. This in turn could lead to more exit rights allocated towards the VC.
Note that in chapter six we will argue that voting shares are not necessarily substitutes for exit
rights. Our regressions support this view. Models (12) in tables 9, 11, and 13 show that the
positive e®ect of the VC majority variable is statistically signi¯cant at least at a 5 percent level.
A VC with a majority of voting rights is 32 (21) percent more likely to get granted a drag-along
right (tag-along right) compared to a VC without a majority of voting rights. We are aware of
the fact that the majority variable is potentially prone to an endogeneity problem, but consider
it is a further piece in a mosaic showing that more ex-ante bargaining of the VC leads to more
exit rights allocated towards the VC.
Finally, to rule out that there is a pure mechanical relationship between more rounds, higher VC
ownership stakes and more bargaining power that drives the inclusion of the trade-sale rights,
we re-run our analysis for ¯rst rounds only (see Models (13) in tables 9, 11, and 13). In this case
we can exclude the possibility that a higher round only occurred because of negative news and
these negative news give the VC more bargaining power. This e®ect should not exist in the ¯rst
round. We ¯nd that even when we only consider ¯rst round investments, our remaining proxies
(closed-end funds and exit expectations) for the hold-up problem remain signi¯cant and point
in the right direction.
Note, however, that regardless of including any of the bargaining power variables this leaves
the hold-up variables { with the exception of the signi¯cance level of the round variable in the
last set of regressions28 { materially unchanged. That is, while we ¯nd evidence that bargaining
power matters, we can show that our original indicators for the hold-up problem remain to be
signi¯cant in almost all cases, validating our initial hypothesis that hold-up matters.
28Including the VC majority variable leads to a drop of the signi¯cance level of the round variable below the
ten percent level. Given the pronounced collinearity of the two variables (in higher rounds VCs are most likely to
have accumulated a higher share in the company) this is not really surprising.
205.2.4 Firm Quality & Pledgeable Income:
Another simple alternative story for the use of trade-sale rights could be di®erences in ¯rm
quality. One idea could be that ¯rms that go public are more pro¯table than ¯rms that are
sold (Bienz (2005)), and thus less pro¯table ¯rms are the ones that require exit rights. Ideally
we would like to employ a variable that captures the VC's expectations about the ¯rm's future
net present value. Unfortunately such a variable is extremely hard to come up with and would,
given the nature of the VC industry, most likely be quite unreliable. Therefore we resort to
several other measures to rule out this competing hypothesis. First, instead of using a trade-sale
dummy, we focus on exit-expectations throughout our entire multivariate analysis. Thus, in all
our regressions, we only ask whether the VC has a plan, not whether he expects a trade-sale
in particular. This should eliminate any direct link between exit choice and ¯rm quality as an
exit plan could also be pursuing an IPO. Second, we directly control for ¯rm quality using the
¯nished product dummy and indirectly using the industry dummies. We ¯nd that this dummy
is signi¯cant in a variety of models and setups, but that this does not a®ect the validity of our
proxies for a hold-up problem. Finally, we ¯nd that for ¯rst rounds, when future ¯rm quality
should matter the least (and the ¯nished product dummy should capture current quality quite
well), that our results still hold (see Models (13) in all our three regressions).
We also need to consider the pledgeable income hypothesis. This alternative explanation rests
on an application of the Aghion/Bolton model (see Aghion and Bolton (1992)) and views exit
rights as a means to allow the VC to ful¯ll his participation constraint. We use two measures for
pledgeable income: the ¯xed asset ratio variable and the size of the ¯rm's balance sheet. These
two balance sheet variables stand as proxies for the amount pledgeable assets (and hence future
income) available. Our regression analysis shows that these variable do not only reveal to have
an insigni¯cant impact on our dependent variables { with the exception of the balance sheet
variable for all exit rights (see Models (14) in tables 9, 11, and 13.) but also partially have the
wrong sign (this is always true for the balance sheet variable and in the case of the drag-along
clause for the ¯xed-asset ratio as well).
It is important to stress, however, that one could also interpret the ¯nished product dummy as
a proxy for (non-)pledgeable income, and not only as a proxy for ¯rm quality per se. As already
discussed it is signi¯cant in the majority of our regressions for the drag-along rights (see table 8
and 9) and has the right sign. This can be interpreted as supporting evidence for the pledgeable
income hypothesis, or it could provide support for the ¯rm quality hypothesis. However, as noted
before and more importantly, our original hypothesis that hold-up matters is still valid.
5.2.5 Entrepreneur Characteristics:
One other explanation that could drive our results is the fundamental uncertainty about the
entrepreneur's preferences. Is the entrepreneur willing to give up control and how important is
he for the venture? We consider two potential proxies for this. The repeat entrepreneur variable
21shows to what extent the entrepreneur was willing to give up control previously, indicating rather
low private bene¯ts of control. In this case, we would expect rather little obstacles against the
VC's exit decision and hence, few exit rights. The entrepreneur-expert variable, in turn, controls
for the inalienability of the entrepreneur's human capital. In this case, the entrepreneur might
be too important for the ¯rm and exit rights might be useless. Therefore we would expect a
negative correlation.
Both variables turn out not to matter at all (see Models (15) in all three tables).
Overall, we ¯nd strong support for the hold-up hypothesis. This is again underlined by the fact
that all three variables are both statistically and economically signi¯cant. This indicates that
the possible occurrence of a hold-up problem determines the allocation of trade sales rights. We
found that it is the hold-up problem between the VCs and the entrepreneur rather than any
hold-up among VCs which is responsible for the allocation of exit rights. In addition, it turned
out that there are further explanation and determinants behind the usage of control rights (such
as VC experience, VC bargaining power, and, to some degree, pledgeable income) but these
determinants complement rather than replace our main hold-up explanation.
6 Substitutes for Exit Rights
Put-options can be extremely valuable in closing down a non-successful venture and are often
regarded as an alternative to explicit exit rights. We think that at least in Germany for several
reasons the latter is not the case. First, for AGs there are limitations to the total amount of
shares that can be repurchased. In Germany an AG is restricted to repurchasing not more
than 10% of all outstanding shares (x71 (1.8) AktG). Second, the ¯rm (regardless of its form
of incorporation) must have enough capital reserves on its balance sheet (x71 (2.1) AktG and
x33 (2) GmbHG) in order to pay for any shares repurchased. As early stage ¯rms often have
negative registered equity on their balance sheet, the e®ectiveness of put-options is at least
very questionable. Alternatively, one could imagine that the entrepreneur, rather than the ¯rm,
issues the put-options. Thus the VC might be able to threaten the entrepreneur with personal
bankruptcy. The e®ectiveness of such a move is highly questionable both in its legal and time
dimension. These legal complications warrant the conclusion that one should not expect put-
options to be frequently used in Germany.
Finally, one might imagine that voting- or board rights might be able to substitute for trade-
sale rights. However, with respect to exit rights, this is normally not true. Generally speaking
shareholders in Germany are more powerful than their American counterparts. In particular,
any coalition of shareholders of an AG combining more than 10% of all shares (with a GmbH
the threshold is 5%) can demand a shareholder's meeting (xAktG 122 and xGmbHG 50). Also,
shareholders have the right to demand a vote on important corporate decisions. Shareholders
also have to agree to a liquidation of the ¯rm (x60 GmbHG and x262 AktG).29 As shareholders
29Shareholders have a veto right in 92% of all cases in our data sample in addition to the rights laid down in
22cannot be forced to sell the ¯rm, the only other way would be a partial sale. However, a major
sale of assets can normally be vetoed by individual shareholders as well.30 Overall, this makes
board rights much less e®ective than exit rights.
That is, we ¯nd that neither board rights nor put options can act as substitutes for trade-sale
rights.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the allocation of exit rights in VC contracts. We thus extend the work
of Smith (2005) on venture capital exits and Kaplan and StrÄ omberg (2003) on venture capital
contracts. We introduce a new data-set of VC contracts from Germany that is build from a base
population that covers approximately 60% of the German VC market from 1990-2004. Within
this sample we analyze the determinants for the allocation of exit rights.
Our paper makes the following contributions to the existing literature:
First, we show that hold-up plays a crucial rule in explaining the use of exit rights, as modelled
by Chemla, Habib, and Ljungqvist (2007). This is independent of whether we control for other
hypothesis, such as bargaining power, VC sophistication, the structure of the VC syndicate, ¯rm
quality, pledgeable income, and entrepreneur characteristics. Additionally, we provide evidence
that our interpretation of the dependent variables as proxies for the presence of a hold-up
problem is indeed warranted. Our results are in line with two contemporaneous papers (Lerner
and Malmendier (2007) and Hotchkiss, Qian, and Song (2005)) that document the same link
between option-style contract clauses and potential hold-up in research alliances and in merger
contracts respectively.
Second, exit rights are allocated to the VC, not the entrepreneur. This is in line with much of the
theoretical literature on venture capital, but is in contrast to the literature on large shareholders.
Third, our results are robust for di®erent types of exit rights and they also indicate that the
di®erent exit rights are complements, rather than substitutes.
Fourth, we use several di®erent proxies for the possibility of hold-up: the round the ¯rm is in,
the presence of exit-expectations and the VC's organizational form, that is whether he ¯nances
himself via a closed-end fund or not. For all three proxies we observe that they are related to
an increase in the use of exit rights. This also allows us, for the ¯rst time, to show that there is
a link between the VC's organizational structure, hold-up and the contractual form: the VC's
organizational structure may make the VC more prone to hold-up. Our results indicate that VCs
attempt to alleviate this by including more exit rights in their contracts with entrepreneurs.
Finally, our results also indicate that hold-up is not the only force that drives the use of exit
rights. In particular, the VC's liquidity needs, as proposed by Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004),
the respective company laws.
30This is a standard provision in ¯rm charters and is employed in 81% of all contracts in our sample
23the VC's amount of bargaining power, and the amount of pledgeable income in the sense of
Aghion and Bolton (1992) also seem to in°uence the use of exit rights. However, we show that
syndication, VC sophistication, and entrepreneurial characteristics do not seem to a®ect the use
of exit rights.
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27Tables
Table 1: VC Summary Statistics
# of ¯nancing rounds 464
# of VCs 91
# of Firms ¯nanced Â 5
Median 2
VC founding year Â 1989
Median 1993
Closed End Funds 240 60%
US VC 29 6.5%
Information Â 2.53
Median 3
VC Type Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Independent VC 37.31 63.92 69.29
Public VC 35.82 20 16.43
Captive VCs 26.87 16.08 14.28
Notes: Summary statistics for 464 investment rounds into
290 entrepreneurial ¯rms by venture capital funds. The
statistics given are the averages per round, not per ¯rm.
Thus, for example, 29 ¯rms were ¯nanced by US VCs
and 240 ¯rms were ¯nanced by VCs that have a closed-
end fund structure. Information is the sum of whether the
¯rm has a web-page, is a member of the German and/or
European Venture Capital Association or whether there
is information available in Thomson Venture Economics.
Thus the index has a range from zero to four.
28Table 2: Firm Summary Statistics
Number of portfolio ¯rms 290
# of ¯nancing rounds 464
Total size of investment Â TEUR 5403
Median TEUR 1305
Age Â 4.77
Median 3.00
Stages Early 66.5%
Legal form GmbH 70%
AG 28%
Others 2%
Origin Germany 92%
France 1%
UK 2%
Others 5%
Industry Bio/Biotech 5%
Medicine 12%
IT/Software 27%
Telecom 6%
Internet 10%
Auto/Eng 15%
Chemistry 4%
Others 14 %
Syndication Â 39%
# of partners 3.69
Median 3.00
Notes: Summary statistics for 464 investment rounds into
290 entrepreneurial ¯rms by venture capital funds. The
statistics given are the averages per round, not per ¯rm.
For staging and staging modes ¯rst column refers to the
number of observations and the second to the percentage.
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30Table 4: Exit right occurrence and correlations
First Descriptive Stats Correlations
Use Obs Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VC preemption (1) 1991 405 0.66 0.47 1
405
E preemption (2) 1991 405 0.32 0.47 0.49*** 1
405 405
Drag-Along (3) 1995 413 0.39 0.49 0.57*** 0.27*** 1
401 401 413
Tag-Along (4) 1994 412 0.50 0.50 0.67*** 0.30*** 0.70*** 1
401 401 408 412
Piggy back (5) 1999 383 0.03 0.17 0.12** 0.08*** 0.22 0.17*** 1
363 363 369 370 383
Demand (6) 2000 337 0.03 0.16 0.15* 0.11* 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.59***
319 319 326 327 329
Notes: Summary statistics and piecewise correlations for exit covenants for 464 investment rounds into
290 entrepreneurial ¯rms by venture capital funds. There is a maximum of two IPO rights (Piggy Back
Rights and Demand rights) while there are four relevant trade-sale rights: Preemption Right, Drag-
Along Right, Tag-Along Right and Anti-Dilution Protection. The left panel of the paper presents the
¯rst year we observe the right and basic summary statistics. The right panel presents the correlations
of the rights (upper row), the number of observations (lower row), and statistical signi¯cance. We use
*, **, and *** to denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 5: Exit Rights: Usage across VCs
Percentiles
Drag-Along Tag-Along All Rights
1% 0 0 0
5% 0 0 0
10% 0 0 0
25% 0 .2 1
50% .4 .5 1.75
75% 0.75 0.87 2.43
90% 0.92 1 2.92
95% 0.92 1 3
99% 1 1 3
Observations 455 458 453
Notes: In this table we present the average usage of drag-
along, tag-along, and all exit rights across VCs. To do
so, we create a variable that depicts the usage of these
rights across the di®erent portfolio ¯rms for each VC,
and then we consider the distribution.
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34Table 9: The determinants of the use of Drag-Along Clauses
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
@f=@x @f=@x @f=@x @f=@x @f=@x @f=@x @f=@x
Round 0.08** 0.09** 0.08** 0.05 0.10** 0.08**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Exit Planned 0.29*** 0.36*** 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.22** 0.32***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
Closed-End Fund 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 0.30*** 0.27***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
VC Age -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01* -0.01**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Syndicate Size 0.01
(0.02)
Fund Age 0.09***
(0.03)
Information -0.01
(0.04)
Fund In°ows -2.E-05 -2.E-05
(0.00) (0.00)
VC Majority 0.32*** 0.24**
(0.10) (0.13)
FAR 0.05
(0.16)
Balance Sheet Size 7.E-08
(0.00)
Repeat Entrepreneur 0.01
(0.10
E-Expert 0.07
(0.10)
Finished Product -0.15* -0.15* -0.16 -0.12 -0.07 -0.15* -0.10
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08)
High-tech Industries 0.14 0.10 0.15* 0.13 0.05 0.20* 0.14
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Period 1 -0.22* -0.28 -0.25* -0.20 -0.10 -0.17 -0.19
(0.10) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Period 3 0.21*** 0.23** 0.29*** 0.19** 0.17* 0.29*** 0.26***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)
Obs. Probability 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.34 0.40 0.43
Pred. Probability 0.35 0.40 0.34 0.36 0.26 0.33 0.36
No of Obs. 287 274 303 301 175 218 263
Wald /Â2 /F-Test 66.17*** 50.49*** 66.51*** 77.44*** 59.30*** 56.65*** 66.87***
Pseudo R2 0.3373 0.3243 0.3541 0.3948 0.3315 0.3550 0.3502
Notes: Probit regression with clustered standard errors at ¯rm-level. Marginal e®ects are indicated. Standard errors
clustered at ¯rm level in parentheses. We use *, **, and *** to denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (for
a two-sided test), respectively. Dependent variable is the DRAG-ALONG DUMMY that takes value one when this
right is present. The variable ROUND indicates the round the investment is in. The PLANNED EXIT DUMMY
indicates whether the VC has an expectation about which form his exit could take place. CLOSED-END FUND is a
dummy for closed- vs open-end funds. SYNDICATE SIZE records the number of VCs ¯nancing the ¯rm currently.
VC MAJORITY is a dummy variable that takes value one when the VC attains a majority in the current round.
US-VC is a dummy for a VC based in the US, UK or Ireland. FUND INFLOWS control for aggregate fund °ows
into the German VC market. INFORMATION ¯nally measures the amount of public information available about
the VC. FAR is the ration of ¯xed assets to the size of the balance sheet. FUND AGE looks at the distance
(in years) between the last fund closing and investment in the current portfolio ¯rm. VC AGE captures the year
the VC founded his ¯rm. BALANCE SHEET SIZE controls for the size of the ¯rm's balance sheet. REPEAT
ENTREPRENEUR controls whether any of the founders has been a CEO or owner of a ¯rm before. E-EXPERT
is a dummy that indicates whether the entrepreneur's human capital is important in the ¯rm. It takes value one if
it is high-tech ¯rm, at least one founder has a research degree and there does not yet exist a ¯nished product. The
variable FINISHED PRODUCT indicates whether the ¯rm has a product that can be sold. Also, we observe the
year when the ¯nancing round is closed and de¯ne three time dummies. The dummy HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES
is a dummy variable that indicates whether the ¯rm's industry is research intensive, that is whether it is a Biotech,
IT/Telecoms or a Traditional High-Tech ¯rm. PERIOD 1 takes value one if the ¯nancing round was closed during
the early period of relatively low venture capital activity, namely before 1998, PERIOD 2 if it was closed during
the boom, i.e. between 1998 and 2000 and PERIOD 3 if it was closed after 2000 - a period of relative decline and
reorganization of the venture capital industry.
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36Table 11: The determinants of the use of Tag-Along Clauses
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
@f=@x @f=@x @f=@x @f=@x @f=@x @f=@x @f=@x
Round 0.09** 0.12** 0.09* 0.08 0.09* 0.09*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Exit Planned 0.29*** 0.38*** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.35*** 0.16 0.28***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
Closed-End Fund 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.23** 0.35*** 0.24***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
VC Age 0.00 -0.01** -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Syndicate Size 0.02
(0.01)
Fund Age 0.06*
(0.03)
Information -0.06
(0.04)
Fund In°ows -2.E-05 -2.E-05
(0.00) (0.00)
VC Majority 0.21** 0.17
(0.09) (0.13)
FAR -0.01
(0.18)
Balance Sheet Size 7.E-08
(0.00)
Repeat Entrepreneur -0.11
(0.09)
E-Expert -0.01 -0.03
(0.00) (0.09)
Finished Product -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
High-tech Industries 0.20** 0.08 0.18* 0.18* 0.16 0.22** 0.17*
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Period 1 -0.15 -0.21 -0.19 -0.13 -0.04 -0.11 -0.09
(0.12) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Period 3 0.23*** 0.22** 0.28*** 0.19*** 0.18* 0.27*** 0.27*
(0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07)
Obs. Probability 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.46 0.54 0.53
Pred. Probability 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.43 0.54 0.54
No of Obs. 283 270 300 299 175 216 259
Wald /Â2 /F-Test 85.19*** 69.26*** 96.20*** 88.88*** 56.86*** 60.97*** 79.31***
Pseudo R2 0.2784 0.2597 0.2873 0.2966 0.2714 0.2615 0.2667
Notes: Probit regression with clustered standard errors at ¯rm-level. Marginal e®ects are indicated. Standard errors
clustered at ¯rm level in parentheses. We use *, **, and *** to denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (for
a two-sided test), respectively. Dependent variable is the TAG-ALONG DUMMY that takes value one when this
right is present. The variable ROUND indicates the round the investment is in. The PLANNED EXIT DUMMY
indicates whether the VC has an expectation about which form his exit could take place. CLOSED-END FUND is a
dummy for closed- vs open-end funds. SYNDICATE SIZE records the number of VCs ¯nancing the ¯rm currently.
VC MAJORITY is a dummy variable that takes value one when the VC attains a majority in the current round.
US-VC is a dummy for a VC based in the US, UK or Ireland. FUND INFLOWS control for aggregate fund °ows
into the German VC market. INFORMATION ¯nally measures the amount of public information available about
the VC. FAR is the ration of ¯xed assets to the size of the balance sheet. FUND AGE looks at the distance
(in years) between the last fund closing and investment in the current portfolio ¯rm. VC AGE captures the year
the VC founded his ¯rm. BALANCE SHEET SIZE controls for the size of the ¯rm's balance sheet. REPEAT
ENTREPRENEUR controls whether any of the founders has been a CEO or owner of a ¯rm before. E-EXPERT
is a dummy that indicates whether the entrepreneur's human capital is important in the ¯rm. It takes value one if
it is high-tech ¯rm, at least one founder has a research degree and there does not yet exist a ¯nished product. The
variable FINISHED PRODUCT indicates whether the ¯rm has a product that can be sold. Also, we observe the
year when the ¯nancing round is closed and de¯ne three time dummies. The dummy HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES
is a dummy variable that indicates whether the ¯rm's industry is research intensive, that is whether it is a Biotech,
IT/Telecoms or a Traditional High-Tech ¯rm. PERIOD 1 takes value one if the ¯nancing round was closed during
the early period of relatively low venture capital activity, namely before 1998, PERIOD 2 if it was closed during
the boom, i.e. between 1998 and 2000 and PERIOD 3 if it was closed after 2000 - a period of relative decline and
reorganization of the venture capital industry.
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38Table 13: The determinants of the use of all Exit Clauses
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Round 0.26** 0.27** 0.26** 0.21* 0.30 0.24**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)** (0.11)
Exit Planned 0.98*** 1.15*** 0.98*** 0.91*** 1.02*** 0.65 0.85***
(0.22) (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24)*** (0.22)
Closed-End Fund 0.58*** 0.64*** 0.57*** 0.53*** 0.73 0.59***
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20)*** (0.18)
VC Age -0.02 -0.02** -0.02* -0.02** -0.02 -0.01 -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Syndicate Size 0.03
(0.03)
Fund Age 0.14
(0.09)
Information -0.03
(0.10)
Fund In°ows -3.E-05 -3.E-05
(0.00) (0.00)
VC Majority 0.59** 0.36
(0.25) (0.37)
FAR -0.43
(0.45)
Balance Sheet Size 2.E-07
(0.00)
Repeat Entrepreneur 0.02
(0.20)
E-Expert 0.06
(0.21)
Finished Product -0.22 -0.21 -0.24 -0.20 -0.23 -0.21 -0.19
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19)
High-tech Industries 0.55*** 0.27 0.52** 0.48** 0.36 0.62 0.56***
(0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.23) (0.23)*** (0.21)
Period 1 -0.21 -0.35 -0.39 -0.22 -0.07 -0.02 -0.27
(0.29) (0.35) (0.30) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.30)
Period 3 0.48*** 0.54*** 0.64*** 0.42** 0.43* 0.73 0.59***
(0.17) (0.22) (0.22) (0.18) (0.23) (0.20)*** (0.19)
No of Obs. 258 249 274 272 155 195 236
Wald /Â2 /F-Test 115.04*** 82.00*** 122.17*** 115.00*** 57.10*** 97.11*** 104.58***
Pseudo R2 0.2012 0.1820 0.2128 0.2225 0.1804 0.1945 0.2026
Notes: Ordered probit regression with clustered standard errors at ¯rm-level. Standard errors clustered at ¯rm
level in parentheses. We use *, **, and *** to denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (for a two-sided
test), respectively. Dependent variable is the EXIT RIGHTS dummy. The EXIT RIGHTS dummy is the sum of
the sale rights found in the sample, that is the sum of the VC's preemption right dummy, as well as the drag
and take-along dummies. The variable ROUND indicates the round the investment is in. The PLANNED EXIT
DUMMY indicates whether the VC has an expectation about which form his exit could take place. CLOSED-END
FUND is a dummy for closed- vs open-end funds. SYNDICATE SIZE records the number of VCs ¯nancing the ¯rm
currently. VC MAJORITY is a dummy variable that takes value one when the VC attains a majority in the current
round. US-VC is a dummy for a VC based in the US, UK or Ireland. FUND INFLOWS control for aggregate fund
°ows into the German VC market. INFORMATION ¯nally measures the amount of public information available
about the VC. FAR is the ration of ¯xed assets to the size of the balance sheet. FUND AGE looks at the distance
(in years) between the last fund closing and investment in the current portfolio ¯rm. VC AGE captures the year
the VC founded his ¯rm. BALANCE SHEET SIZE controls for the size of the ¯rm's balance sheet. REPEAT
ENTREPRENEUR controls whether any of the founders has been a CEO or owner of a ¯rm before. E-EXPERT
is a dummy that indicates whether the entrepreneur's human capital is important in the ¯rm. It takes value one if
it is high-tech ¯rm, at least one founder has a research degree and there does not yet exist a ¯nished product. The
variable FINISHED PRODUCT indicates whether the ¯rm has a product that can be sold. Also, we observe the
year when the ¯nancing round is closed and de¯ne three time dummies. The dummy HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES
is a dummy variable that indicates whether the ¯rm's industry is research intensive, that is whether it is a Biotech,
IT/Telecoms or a Traditional High-Tech ¯rm. PERIOD 1 takes value one if the ¯nancing round was closed during
the early period of relatively low venture capital activity, namely before 1998, PERIOD 2 if it was closed during
the boom, i.e. between 1998 and 2000 and PERIOD 3 if it was closed after 2000 - a period of relative decline and
reorganization of the venture capital industry.
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